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contributions. The second most important field after the Kirkuk field is the southern field of Rumaila. The north Rumaila field produces about 750,000 bpd, while south Rumaila adds another 500,000 bpd. Other large southern fields include Al-Zubair (240,000 bpd), Mis- san (160,000 bpd), and West Qurna (120,000 bpd). These fields depend on water injection systems and gas treatment facilities. Pro- duction from southern oil fields is exported via a pipeline that extends to northern Iraq and connects to the Turkish pipeline and via the gulf offshore terminal of Mina al-Bakr. American military planners should give careful consideration to protecting the Kirkuk field in particular. Its proximity to the U.S.- U.K. no-fly zone will make this field highly vulnerable. Beyond the benefits that the Kirkuk field will provide to humanitarian aid programs for all of Iraq, Turkey relies on pipeline tariff revenue from exports from this field. Protecting this field will not be an easy nor an obvious prior- ity, as its preservation could pose major security challenges. In 1991, during Desert Storm, Kurdish militants briefly occupied the headquarters of the Kirkuk oil industry during the generalized unrest around the area. Kurdish communities now earn 13 percent of Iraq s [20] 74038Textpages 1/23/03 8:02 AM Page 21 Addendum revenues from northern oil production and will want continued access to this important income stream. Although Kurdish com- munities benefit greatly from the UN oil-for-food program, the slow turnaround in the repatriation of humanitarian aid and the real stakes involved for Kurdish identity mean that Kurdish coop- eration regarding Kirkuk is not a given. Nonetheless, the bene- fits of protecting the field far outweigh the alternative. The southern Rumaila fields would also be an important installation to protect, although the task may be complicated by their location in Shi a border areas. Access to electrical power is also a critical input to operating and maintaining oil fields and powering export pipelines in Iraq. Severe damage to power stations in and around major oil instal- lations will greatly reduce the level of Iraqi exports. POST-HOSTILITIES: STABILIZING THE SYSTEM One of the first priorities in Iraq after the war will be to stabilize current oil-production capacity. In June 2001, a UN report stat- ed that Iraq continues to face significant technical and infrastructural problems, which unless addressed will inevitably result in the reduction of crude oil production. In fact, Iraq s current production capacity is declining at the rate of 100,000 bpd annually. Because of the extensive repair work required to stabilize the system and the vulnerability of Iraq s oil fields to damage under scenarios of sudden or prolonged shutdown, the country s oil- production capacity could actually decrease, rather than easily be rehabilitated and expanded as the media have incorrectly suggested. Although we believe the possibility to be low that such orders would be carried out, Saddam Hussein could order his troops to set alight certain or all Iraqi oil fields just as he did in Kuwait in 1991. Kuwaiti fires required eight months and approximately $2 billion to douse. Kuwait took over two years to restore oil production to full capacity from the time the fires were smothered. Saddam could also order missile attacks on certain oil installations occu- pied by coalition forces or localized groups during the early days of a campaign. Any such act would clearly set back oil-facility recon- [21] 74038Textpages 1/23/03 8:02 AM Page 22 Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Iraq struction timelines, in addition to bringing grave economic hard- ship on the Iraqi people. These scenarios are not very likely, how- ever, as Iraqi soldiers and oil technicians would be reluctant to destroy the country s future. But in a war setting, no such scenario can be completely ruled out, especially if the Iraqi leadership can arouse nationalistic sentiment regarding the country s oil wealth. Damage, accidental or collateral, to key processing facilities could also affect Iraq s ability to restore production and exports rapid- ly in the aftermath of a military campaign. Some processing facil- ities, such as gas processing and gas-oil separation plants, would take a few years to repair or reconstruct (in Kuwait, it takes about two years to build a 100,000 bpd gas-oil separation plant). Oil pipeline pumping stations could require many months if not years to repair and reconstruct. It could take several months of workover and new drilling activity to repair reservoirs from any damage sus- tained from sudden or prolonged shutdowns, leading to some loss [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ] |
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